民國17年4月革命軍北伐以求統一之際，北伐軍進入山東濟南時，日軍藉口保護當地日僑，出兵濟南，屠殺我軍民，我前往對日交涉之公使蔡公時慘遭殺害，是為「五三慘案」。
民國26年7月7日，日軍河邊旅團在北平近郊宛平縣盧溝橋一帶演習，藉口演習有一名士兵失蹤，欲進城搜查，我當時駐軍二十九軍三十七師第二一九團吉星文團長拒絕。日軍悍然向縣城守軍發動攻擊，我軍以守土有責，奮起應戰，是為七七盧溝橋事變。
奧匈帝國皇儲費迪南大公夫婦在塞拉耶佛被槍殺。奧匈帝國以此爲藉口，得到德國的支援後，於1914年7月28日出兵塞爾維亞。這件事成為第一次世界大戰的導火線。
... 手邊已經沒有高中的歷史課本了，所以就從網路上找到一些印象中與當年課本相似的敘述。我有一位同學在課堂上問老師，「為什麼課本裡對這些戰爭發生的原因都不提，卻只說藉口呢？『原因』應該才是歷史要教的，而不是『藉口』啊！」當老師讚這是個好問題時，我想這應該很好理解，原因通常錯綜複雜而且可能有不同看法，但是藉口卻是公開表示的。－所以對於戰爭，所有公開表示的原因，其實都是藉口！這歷史課本的作者／編者不斷地在每一個戰爭的敘述中不厭其煩地講著「藉口」，其中的學問就在此！
如果要發動戰爭，一定要找到「藉口」；所有公開表示的原因，其實都是藉口。
在當時的政治氣氛與環境，編歷史課本的人是不可能有董狐之筆的，如果有，也編不了歷史課本。但是史家傳統對「春秋一字之褒，榮於華袞，一字之貶，嚴於斧鉞」的認知還是有的，但是高中生那樣的年紀，又有甚麼人能讀出微言大義呢？
推翻一個政府或政權的正當性為何呢？我想這是很難提出一個合理的說法。革命與政變基本上是同一件事，只不過是觀點或解釋不同罷了，但所有的理論或合理化的原因似乎都輪不到一到外國政府以武力來促成！可是運用國際輿論、經濟制裁、抵制等等似乎都無法有效地達到政權更替的目標。海珊或許胡作非為，但是外國政府似乎也無能為力。那麼伊拉克人民又如何能擺脫海珊呢？伊拉克的人民是否「美軍生擒海珊日，家祭無忘告乃翁」？
布萊爾承認即使沒有大規模毀滅性武器還是會入侵伊拉克，難道小布希不是嗎？巴拿馬的諾瑞加(Manuel Antonio Noriega)被老布希抓去了，小布希也不讓老爸專美於前，抓一個伊拉克的海珊。不過還是年輕的較心狠手辣，諾瑞加只是被關起來，海珊就被吊死了。這是兩次美國出兵推翻外國政府的例子。這兩起戰爭都是侵略行為，不過應該都有不少人民殷殷企盼吧。我一方面希望伊拉克人民可以過好日子，一方面又希望布希和布萊爾之流可以被逞罰，我好像太貪心了！看在伊拉克人民的份上，我只要他們承認所謂大規模毀滅性武器根本就是編造的，也不求任何懲罰了。
齊宣王問曰：「湯放桀，武王伐紂，有諸？」
孟子對曰：「於傳有之。」
曰：「臣弒其君可乎？」
曰：「賊仁者謂之賊，賊義者謂之殘；殘賊之人，謂之一夫。聞誅一夫紂矣。未聞弒君也。」
或許對於小布希誅海珊一事，我應該這樣理解。那入侵阿富汗呢？在人稱潘傑希爾之獅（Lion of Panjshir）的馬蘇德(Ahmad Shah Massoud)遇刺兩天後就發生了911攻擊事件，所以這件攻擊就是基地（蓋達）組織做的，所以必須要消滅神學士（塔利班）政權？
神學士（塔利班）也是一夫嗎？哈米德·卡爾扎伊（Hamid Karzai）與前北方聯盟能真正建立一個有效控制與管理的政府？
Riazat But and Richard Norton-Taylor
The Guardian, Saturday 12 December 2009
Tony Blair and Fern BrittonTony Blair told Fern Britton, in an interview to be broadcast on BBC1, that he would have found a way to justify the Iraq invasion. Photograph: BBC
Tony Blair has said he would have invaded Iraq even without evidence of weapons of mass destruction and would have found a way to justify the war to parliament and the public.The former prime minister made the confession during an interview with Fern Britton, to be broadcast on Sunday on BBC1, in which he said he would still have thought it right to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
"If you had known then that there were no WMDs, would you still have gone on?" Blair was asked. He replied: "I would still have thought it right to remove him [Saddam Hussein]".
Significantly, Blair added: "I mean obviously you would have had to use and deploy different arguments about the nature of the threat." He continued: "I can't really think we'd be better with him and his two sons in charge, but it's incredibly difficult. That's why I sympathise with the people who were against it [the war] for perfectly good reasons and are against it now, but for me, in the end I had to take the decision."
He explained
it was "the notion of him as a threat to the region" because Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against his own people.
"This was obviously the thing that was uppermost in my mind. The threat to the region. Also the fact of how that region was going to change and how in the end it was going to evolve as a region and whilst he was there, I thought and actually still think,
it would have been very difficult to have changed it in the right way."
Though Blair has always argued that Iraq would be better off without Saddam Hussein, to parliament and the public,
he always justified military action on the grounds that the Iraqi dictator was in breach of UN-backed demands that he abandon his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme.It is possible that Blair has shifted his ground in anticipation of his appearance early next year before the
Chilcot inquiry. The inquiry has heard that
Blair made clear to President George Bush at a meeting in Texas 11 months before the Iraq invasion that he would be prepared to join the US in toppling Saddam.Blair was "absolutely prepared to say he was willing to contemplate regime change if [UN-backed measures] did not work", Sir David Manning, Blair's former foreign policy adviser, told the inquiry. If it proved impossible to pursue the UN route, then Blair would be "willing to use force", Manning emphasised.
The Chilcot inquiry has seen a number of previously leaked Whitehall documents which suggest Blair was in favour of regime change although he was warned by Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, in July 2002, eight months before the invasion, that "
the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action".
Manning told Blair in March that year that he had underlined Britain's position to Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser.
