2010-02-17 01:44:43| 人氣2,556| 回應0 | 上一篇 | 下一篇

[EU] 單一貨幣使得南歐各國難以擺脫債務危機

推薦 0 收藏 0 轉貼0 訂閱站台

「你不是說西班牙在這自金融海嘯中沒受到甚麼影響嗎？」同學問道。的確是，在過去這一年半，尤其是08年下半年到09年上半年，不論是經濟學人還是紐約時報，都對西班牙的金融機構給予很高的評價，原本被認為過於保守的西班牙金融業所使用的會計規範，後來被認為是一種穩健、安全的設計。這些報導中都「只針對金融機構，尤其是銀行。我並沒有了解到政府部門的預算與支出情形。」我這麼答。

在前天讀了克魯格曼在紐約時報的專欄後發現：西班牙原先真是一個財政的模範國家（2007年，西班牙的負債只占GDP的43%，而德國是66%），然而歐元區其他地區的錢大筆的流進西班牙，造成了房地產的泡沫，也帶動了通貨膨脹；從2000年到2008年，西班牙商品與勞務價格上漲了35%，而德國卻只有漲了10%。

如果西班牙仍使用比塞塔（peseta）而非歐元，情況或許會簡單許多，西班牙可以透過比塞塔對其他主要貨幣貶值來恢復其商品的競爭力。克魯格曼的估計是貶值20% 。然而因為採用歐元之後，西班牙就喪失了這項有力的工具了。似乎只能倚賴其他歐元的成員國家的援助，節省開支。但是在經濟情況如此糟的情況下（失業率大幅上升，消費者信心不足），政府不但不能擴大公共支出，由政府出面雇用人力，降低失業率，增加人們手中的現金並促使其消費，反而要樽節支出，使國家的貨幣緊縮，經濟恐怕要進一步蕭條。

前幾年我也聽Kevin說義大利因為採用歐元，造成巨大的通貨膨脹，許多義大利人都吃不消。薪資沒什麼變動，但是所有的東西都變貴了。或許除了希臘、西班牙、葡萄牙之外義大利就是下一個傳出債信危機的國家。(過去幾年義大利的財長發表了幾次退出歐元集團的談話。)

或許就如克魯格曼所說的，歐洲的債信問題不是因為政客亂花錢，而是政策精英的傲慢－－儘管許許多多的專家提出警告，歐洲單一貨幣的條件尚未形成，他們依然執意推行單一貨幣的政策。若是現在個別國家又重新使用其本國貨幣呢？Krugman並沒有說明，但是「就如同加州大學柏克萊分校的經濟學教授Barry Eichengreen所說的，這將會是『各種金融危機之母』」。

事實上，Krugman常對歐洲的經濟與財政政策提出批評。請參閱下面所引用去年三月他在紐約時報上的專欄 "A Continent Adrift", 他指出歐洲大陸未能有效回應金融危機。在財政和貨幣政策方面都做得不夠。歐洲衰退的嚴重程度不下於美國，但它對抗衰退的作為遠不如美國。然而一般人批評的社會福利太過慷慨，卻被他認為是最有助益的政策；因為歐洲不會像美國有那麼多人受苦受難，而這些社會福利有助於在衰退期間支撐消費支出。歐洲最大的問題一方面是領導人的能力（或根本沒有人負責財經政策，且會員國的意見也經常南轅北轍），一方面經濟的整合遠遠領先其政治整合，使用歐元之後，單一國家可以使用的貨幣政策的選擇也變少了。

Op-Ed Columnist
The Making of a Euro mess

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: February 14, 2010

Lately, financial news has been dominated by reports from Greece and other nations on the European periphery. And rightly so.

But I’ve been troubled by reporting that focuses almost exclusively on European debts and deficits, conveying the impression that it’s all about government profligacy — and feeding into the narrative of our
own deficit hawks, who want to slash spending even in the face of mass unemployment, and hold Greece up as an object lesson of what will happen if we don’t.

Profligacy is the spending of too much money or the using of too much of something.

For the truth is that lack of fiscal discipline isn’t the whole, or even the main, source of Europe’s troubles — not even in Greece, whose government was indeed irresponsible (and hid its irresponsibility with
creative accounting).

No, the real story behind the euromess lies not in the profligacy of politicians but in the arrogance of elites — specifically, the policy elites who pushed Europe into adopting a single currency well before the continent was ready for such an experiment.

Consider the case of Spain, which on the eve of the crisis appeared to be a model fiscal citizen. Its debts were low — 43 percent of G.D.P. in 2007, compared with 66 percent in Germany. It was running budget
surpluses. And it had exemplary bank regulation.

But with its warm weather and beaches, Spain was also the Florida of Europe — and like Florida, it experienced a huge housing boom. The financing for this boom came largely from outside the country: there were giant inflows of capital from the rest of Europe, Germany in particular.

The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, the prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in
Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to the housing boom.

Then the bubble burst. Spanish unemployment soared, and the budget went into deep deficit. But the flood of red ink — which was caused partly by the way the slump depressed revenues and partly by emergency
spending to limit the slump’s human costs — was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.

And there’s not much that Spain’s government can do to make things better. The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in the rest of Europe. If Spain
still had its old currency, the peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing the value of a peseta by 20 percent against other European currencies. But Spain no longer
has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.

deflation n. a reduction in the amount of money in a country's economy so that prices fall or remain the same 通貨緊縮(市場缺乏貨幣，市場缺乏貨幣就會讓物價下跌，廠商入不敷出(售價低於成本)而倒閉，大量失業潮出現。然而認為利率的改變，就能增加市場中的貨幣流量，也太過天真。畢竟一般人賺不到錢，害怕沒工作而儲蓄起來的現金，可不會只因為利率的改變，便開始增加消費。)

Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was
freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the
crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks.

But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble. Greece, of course, is in even deeper trouble, because the Greeks, unlike the Spaniards, actually were fiscally irresponsible. Greece, however, has a small economy, whose troubles matter mainly because they’re spilling over to much bigger economies, like Spain’s. So the inflexibility of the euro, not deficit spending, lies at the heart of the crisis.

None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency. But these warnings were ignored, and the crisis came.

Now what? A breakup of the euro is very nearly unthinkable, as a sheer matter of practicality. As Berkeley’s Barry Eichengreen puts it, an attempt to reintroduce a national currency would trigger “the mother
of all financial crises.” So the only way out is forward: to make the euro work, Europe needs to move much further toward political union, so that European nations start to function more like American states.

But that’s not going to happen anytime soon. What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a
background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.

It’s an ugly picture. But it’s important to understand the nature of Europe’s fatal flaw. Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15krugman.html

Op-Ed Columnist

A Continent Adrift
By Paul Krugman
Published: March 16, 2009

MADRID

I’m concerned about Europe. Actually, I’m concerned about the whole world — there are no safe havens from the global economic storm. But the situation in Europe worries me even more than the situation in America.

Just to be clear, I’m not about to rehash the standard American complaint that Europe’s taxes are too high and its benefits too generous. Big welfare states aren’t the cause of Europe’s current crisis. In fact, as I’ll explain shortly, they’re actually a mitigating factor.

The clear and present danger to Europe right now comes from a different direction — the continent’s failure to respond effectively tothe financial crisis.

Europe has fallen short in terms of both fiscal and monetary policy:it’s facing at least as severe a slump as the United States, yet it’s doing far less to combat the downturn.

On the fiscal side, the comparison with the United States is striking. Many economists, myself included, have argued that the Obama administration’s stimulus plan is too small, given the depth of the crisis. But America’s actions dwarf anything the Europeans are doing.

The difference in monetary policy is equally striking. The European Central Bank has been far less proactive than the Federal Reserve; it has been slow to cut interest rates (it actually raised rates last July), and it has shied away from any strong measures to unfreeze credit markets.

The only thing working in Europe’s favor is the very thing for which it takes the most criticism — the size and generosity of its welfare states, which are cushioning the impact of the economic slump.

This is no small matter. Guaranteed health insurance and generous unemployment benefits ensure that, at least so far, there isn’t as much sheer human suffering in Europe as there is in America. And these programs will also help sustain spending in the slump.

But such “automatic stabilizers” are no substitute for positive action.

Why is Europe falling short? Poor leadership is part of the story. European banking officials, who completely missed the depth of the crisis, still seem weirdly complacent. And to hear anything in America comparable to the know-nothing diatribes of Germany’s finance minister you have to listen to, well, Republicans.

A diatribe is an angry speech or article which is extremely critical of someone's ideas or activities.

But there’s a deeper problem: Europe’s economic and monetary integration has run too far ahead of its political institutions. The economies of Europe’s many nations are almost as tightly linked as the economies of America’s many states — and most of Europe shares a common currency. But unlike America, Europe doesn’t have the kind of continentwide institutions needed to deal with a continentwide crisis.

This is a major reason for the lack of fiscal action: there’s no government in a position to take responsibility for the European economy as a whole. What Europe has, instead, are national governments,each of which is reluctant to run up large debts to finance a stimulus that will convey many if not most of its benefits to voters in other countries.

You might expect monetary policy to be more forceful. After all,while there isn’t a European government, there is a European Central Bank. But the E.C.B. isn’t like the Fed, which can afford to be adventurous because it’s backed by a unitary national government — a government that has already moved to share the risks of the Fed’s boldness, and will surely cover the Fed’s losses if its efforts to unfreeze financial markets go bad. The E.C.B., which must answer to 16often-quarreling governments, can’t count on the same level of support.

Europe, in other words, is turning out to be structurally weak in a time of crisis.

The biggest question is what will happen to those European economies that boomed in the easy-money environment of a few years ago, Spain in particular.

For much of the past decade Spain was Europe’s Florida, its economy buoyed by a huge speculative housing boom. As in Florida, boom has now turned to bust. Now Spain needs to find new sources of income and employment to replace the lost jobs in construction.

In the past, Spain would have sought improved competitiveness by devaluing its currency. But now it’s on the euro — and the only way forward seems to be a grinding process of wage cuts. This process would have been difficult in the best of times; it will be almost inconceivably painful if, as seems all too likely, the European economy as a whole is depressed and tending toward deflation for years to come.

Does all this mean that Europe was wrong to let itself become so tightly integrated? Does it mean, in particular, that the creation of the euro was a mistake? Maybe.

But Europe can still prove the skeptics wrong, if its politicians start showing more leadership. Will they?

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/opinion/16krugman.html?_r=1

The articles were taken from the website of The New York Times. The copyright remains with The New York Times Company. Dr. Paul Krugman and The New York Times are not involved with, nor endorse the production of this blog.

新聞分析－紓困退場機制宜早祭出

工商時報【蕭美惠】
更新日期:2010/02/06 03:25

PIGS四國（葡萄牙，義大利，希臘及西班牙）的財政困難，已使得歐元區陷入成立11年來最嚴重的危機。從一開始，歐元區就是靠著政治承諾強行成立的貨幣聯盟，如今落到這般田地，同樣也須藉由政治承諾來維繫完整。但是，歐元區若想成為勢力可觀的組織，讓歐元躋身全球主要存底貨幣，就應該要正式設定疲弱會員國的紓困方案，甚或退場策略，才能恢復投資人的信心。

回顧歐洲單一貨幣成立11年來，一開始並不順遂，還在2000年10月跌到不及0.83美元的歷史谷底。直到2002年中，歐元有將近3年時間兌換不到1美元，稱不上強勢貨幣。但之後歐元逐漸站穩腳跟，一路扶搖直上，於2008年4月飆到兌1.60美元的歷史高峰。若不是雷曼兄弟於2008年第3季破產，歐元或許已如預期般升抵兌2美元大關。

由此而言，歐元區也是這場世紀金融危機的最大受害者之一。這場空前的危機讓歐元區被迫面對禁忌議題－如何為疲弱會員國紓困？是否應該讓這些弱國退出？或許修改嚴苛的加入門檻？

歐元區加入規定之一是預算赤字不得超過佔GDP的3％，放眼天下，這是一條極其嚴苛的規定。以歐巴馬總統的最新預算案而言，今年美國預算赤字佔GDP比率將達10.6％，預期未來10 年平均比率仍高達4.5％。連美國都如此，勞動市場僵化、缺乏競爭力的南歐國家怎麼辦到。

希臘預定於4月到5月償還200億歐元國債，如果能在債市成功重新融資，就可避開立即的償債危機。如若不然，歐元區一定要設法為希臘籌錢。問題是誰要出面主導紓困，是歐元區裏的強國德國，或是歐洲央行，還是國際貨幣組織（IMF）？

希臘危機對歐元區至關重要的原因不在於她會是壓垮駱駝的最後一根稻草（西班牙才會是），而是在於全球都在看歐元區要把希臘當成個案處理，或是設定「希臘模式」，不論紓困或退出，將來財政困難的會員國都可依循相同模式。金融市場也能預測情勢的發展，減少歐元區所受的衝擊，不致再像現在這樣幾乎要被不確定性淹沒。

社論

歐元區面對的新挑戰

2010-02-02 工商時報

1999年成立的歐洲單一貨幣機制，今年邁入第2個十年，卻立即遭遇希臘與西班牙財政危機的衝擊。毒舌派專家如新末日博士盧比尼即警告歐元區遲早會被西班牙拖垮，美國企業研究所研究員拉克曼則判斷希臘會以退出歐元區的悲劇收場。換言之，「合則立」的歐洲統合精神，正面臨如何共富貴又能共患難的空前挑戰。若果歐元區最終被迫壯士斷腕，擺脫末段會員國的拖累，又算不算是這項劃時代固定匯率機制的失敗？

對於歐元區形將瓦解的預言，並不是第一次出現。從歐元成立之初，就不乏唱衰者，當時有人甚至擔心歐元的出現只會製造新的貨幣戰爭。然而走過新手上路的慌亂期，如今歐元不僅未曾成為任何貨幣戰爭的「禍首」，反而已是各國外匯存底的重要組合。因此，當歐洲央行總裁特里榭日前以「荒謬」嚴詞反駁盧比尼的瓦解說，並非全然無所本的口舌之快。然而，特里榭應該也深知，過去歐元區成員國排除萬難統一貨幣的英勇，也絕非未來不敗的保證。

歐洲統合的堅定決心，源於對二次大戰生靈塗炭的深切反省，以及不依賴美國霸權的憂患意識。從1958年歐洲6國成立歐洲經濟共同體（EEC）開始，到1992年簽署奠定貨幣統合基礎的馬斯垂克條約，以迄1999年歐元區正式成立，歐洲人花了近半世紀的時間統合政治經濟與貨幣事務，一再寫傳奇，也一再令世人驚奇。

「驚奇」之一在於馬斯垂克條約所訂定的高入會標準，包括：
1. 一國財政赤字占國內生產毛額（GDP）比重不得超過3％，且政府債務總額不得超過GDP的60％；
2. 各國消費者物價上漲率不得比通膨率最低的3個國家之平均超出1.5個百分點；
3. 長期利率不得比通膨率最低的3個國家之公債殖利率高出2個百分點；
4. 匯率需穩定在歐洲匯率機制的上下各2.25％。

也就是說，有意入會者除了必須致力物價與財政穩定外，不管大國或小國，不論富國或窮國，都必須放棄匯率與利率政策的自主權，遵守共同的雙率政策。即使犧牲不小，但為了分享經濟統合的果實，1999年歐元區初創即招收到11個「好學生」，包括西班牙在內；希臘在2001年設法搭上車，到2008年歐元區會員已擴大到16國。一直希望成為歐洲國家的土耳其，則還在排隊候審。

最大的例外是英國。英國在90年代初加入歐元前身的歐洲匯率機制（ERM），不意引發92年炒匯大鱷索若斯放空英鎊危機。一朝被固定匯率咬，導致英國即使在99年已具入會資格，至今仍拒絕加入歐元區。

「驚奇」之二是入會後不准輕言退出。這項規定原意在維持歐元區的穩定性，現在卻成了綁住歐元區的最大包袱。由於沒有退場機制，當局沒有監督、導正會員的工具，「好學生」入會後便可能露出狐狸尾巴，大肆低利借貸揮霍，例如希臘預算赤字在短短8年間，即從達標準的3％躥升到12.7％，政府總負債比更倍增為120％。

相對地，當出口導向的亞洲國家善用雙率政策應付金融海嘯之際，愛爾蘭、西班牙與希臘等歐元重災區，卻必須繼續忍受歐元升值戕害競爭力，而失業率爆表更是雪上加霜。這也是外界認定希臘不退出歐元區，就只有死路一條的原因。以希臘對照英國，儘管後者財政狀況亦不樂觀，但至少保有雙率政策的因應彈性。

對於致力統合的歐洲人而言，他們自許歐盟是一股以柔克剛的力量，有別於美國以武力炫耀強權。歐元區走過10年，當局的確也用事實證明了，即使在瞬息萬變的全球化浪潮下，固定匯率依然可行。然而一如備受推崇的市場經濟在金融風暴後飽受質疑，固定匯率制度更不會是完美無瑕的設計，一場金融大難，即已將其脆弱暴露無遺。

因此，歐元區的遊戲規則顯然也無法再照著馬斯垂克的高標玩下去。必須適度放寬，否則各會員國單是忙著「宣示」緊縮財政，就可能對民間造成雨天收傘的負面作用，引發另一波衰退。其次，當局也必須著手設計退場機制，與其讓不長進或跟不上的會員國「混吃等死」，不如放手讓他們尋求外援，等找到活路再來談復籍。就算此舉會短暫影響歐元區的信譽，讓歐元版圖縮小，但畢竟裡子還是比面子重要。

全球金融海嘯的衝擊，仍然持續發酵中，歐元區遭遇的挑戰極其嚴峻。對於亞元區的倡議者來說，歐元區能否與時俱進、安度難關，正是一本活教材，更沒有不關注的道理。

http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,11051403+122010020200190,00.html

以上文章節錄自工商時報網站，版權為工商時報所有。

我要檢舉