資料來源:
http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/report.cfm?publicationID=131
All countries that have deployed long-range ballistic missiles (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) have developed, produced, and in some cases deployed, countermeasures for their missiles. There is no reason to believe that emerging missile states would behave differently, especially when US missile defense development is front-page news.
所有那些有能力製造長程彈道飛彈的國家(美.俄.法.英與中共)
都已經研發 製造甚至佈署了特定的反制系統
因此美國能做到的 沒有理由相信人家會做不到
Many highly effective countermeasures require a lower level of technology than that required to build a long-range ballistic missile (or nuclear weapon). The United States must anticipate that any potentially hostile country developing or acquiring ballistic missiles would have a parallel program to develop or acquire countermeasures to make those missiles effective in the face of US missile defenses. Countermeasure programs could be concealed from US intelligence much more easily than missile programs, and the United States should not assume that a lack of intelligence evidence is evidence that countermeasure programs do not exist.
許多相當有效的反制系統都不需太高的科技程度(相較與核武或長程彈道飛彈)
因此美國必需預見這些國家都會在發展飛彈計畫的同時 開發或購買反制系統
而且這些反制系統可能更不易為美國情報單位發現(相較於飛彈研發計畫)
所以美國不應認為"情報未確定"就代表反制技術不存在
Many countermeasures are based on basic physical principles and well-understood technologies. As a consequence, a vast amount of technical information relevant to building and deploying countermeasures is publicly available. Any country capable of building a long-range ballistic missile would have the scientific and technical expertise, including people who have worked on missiles for many years, to exploit the available technologies. Moreover, a great deal of technical information about the planned NMD system and its sensors has been published. A potential attacker could learn from a variety of open sources enough about the planned NMD system to design countermeasures to defeat it.
許多研發反制系統的技術都是公開的
因此那些有能力製造長程彈道飛彈的國家都會具有這方面的能力
來研發這些技術
另外 許多飛彈防禦的技術資料也是公開的
因此未來的攻擊者大可以利用許多公開的資料來源
來設計出自己的反制系統 對抗國家飛彈防衛
To determine whether technically simple countermeasures would be effective against the planned NMD system, we examined three potential countermeasures in detail: submunitions with biological or chemical weapons, nuclear warheads with anti-simulation balloon decoys, and nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds. We find that any of these would defeat the planned NMD system. They would either significantly degrade the effectiveness of the defense or make it fail completely. Moreover, these countermeasures would defeat the planned NMD system even if they were anticipated by the United States. And because these countermeasures use readily available materials and straightforward technologies, any emerging missile state could readily construct and employ them.
在本文中針對了三項可能的反制方式:
a.含有生化武器的次彈械
b.具有誘餌的核彈頭
c.具有冷卻能力的核彈頭
來作詳細的分析
它們都可以有效地降低防衛系統的能力
甚至使其完全失效
因此那些具有飛彈的國家可能已經在建造或佈署它們
Submunitions with Biological or Chemical Weapons. To deliver biological or chemical weapons by long-range ballistic missile, an attacker could divide the agent for each missile among a hundred or more small warheads, or submunitions, that would be released shortly after boost phase. These submunitions would be too numerous for a limited defense -- such as the planned NMD system -- to even attempt to intercept all of them.
Our analysis demonstrates that the attacker could readily keep the reentry heating of the submunitions low enough to protect the agents from excessive heat. Moreover, because submunitions would distribute the agent over a large area and disseminate it at low speeds, they would be a more effective means of delivering biological and chemical agents by ballistic missile than would a single large warhead. Thus, an attacker would have a strong incentive to use submunitions, aside from any concerns about missile defenses.
a.
攻擊方可以把生化武器裝入一百個甚至更多的次彈械內(小彈頭)
並在推進期後很快地散佈出來
對防禦系統來說 將會因這些次彈械數量太多而無法防衛
分析顯示攻擊方可以保持彈頭在重新進入大氣層時的溫度不會太高
(太高溫會殺死或中和生化武器的效果)
而且多個小彈頭在各處慢慢地釋出生化武器
遠比單單靠一枚彈道飛彈來得更有效果
Nuclear Weapons with Anti-simulation Balloon Decoys. Anti-simulation is a powerful tactic in which the attacker disguises the warhead to make it look like a decoy, rather than attempting the more difficult task of making every decoy closely resemble a specific warhead.
To use this tactic, the attacker could place a nuclear warhead in a lightweight balloon made of aluminized mylar and release it along with a large number of similar, but empty balloons. The balloon containing the warhead could be made indistinguishable from the empty ones to all the defense sensors -- including the ground-based radars, the satellite-based infrared sensors, and the sensors on the kill vehicle. The defense would therefore need to shoot at all the balloons to prevent the warhead from getting through, but the attacker could deploy so many balloons that the defense would run out of interceptors.
b.
敵方可以將真的彈頭偽裝成一枚誘餌
將彈頭包裹在特製的氣球中
再與一批類似的氣球一起施放出去
這時無論是太空中的衛星 陸基雷達或截殺載具本身
都無法分辨出來到底彈頭在哪個氣球裡
因此它們必需把所有的目標都擊落 才能確定安全
但敵方大可以製造夠多的廉價氣球 讓你耗盡截殺載具
Nuclear Weapons with Cooled Shrouds. The attacker could cover a nuclear warhead with a shroud cooled to a low temperature by liquid nitrogen. The cooled shroud would reduce the infrared radiation emitted by the warhead by a factor of at least one million. This would make it nearly impossible for the kill vehicle's heat-seeking infrared sensors to detect the warhead at a great enough distance to have time to maneuver to hit it.
c.
敵方還可以用液態氮冷卻核彈頭的前端
因為其溫度降低 所以減少了紅外線的發散
使得靠追熱系統捕捉目標的獵殺載具
幾乎不可能在足夠調整航向的距離外找到它
p.s.
這三種方式除了個別應用外 也可以同時使用
而且真正的反制技術 也不會只有這三種
如果今天國防部有用點大腦 就會看到這篇文章 並且告訴我解決之道為何!
另外 今天任何一個國家就算用這三種技術
以核生化彈頭摧毀了美國部份地區
它自身也難逃美國以核子武力反擊的命運
但台灣呢?
台灣的飛彈防禦系統萬一失效
要拿什麼東西反過來砸中共呢?
人人每週省一杯珍珠奶茶就換來國家安全?
你以為我們都是和你一樣的白癡嗎?
