自從以軍事反抗為主的Hamas選舉贏得巴勒斯坦政府後，讓以巴的形式更趨複雜。Hamas贏得選舉的原因在於過去阿拉法特所領導的Fatah黨過於腐敗而且政府無能，因此，導致人民怨聲載道而唾棄它。而Hamas則予人民紀律嚴謹，誠實，意見一致而獲得人民信賴。但是，隨著贏得選舉後所獲得的權力，已經引發了內部的分歧導致派系，尤其是在外流亡的領袖通常都因為不在自己土地上，而傾向更為激進，並且不理由在本地的領導人，例如現在的巴勒斯坦總理。
最近巴勒斯坦綁架了一位以色列士兵使得Hamas的分裂更趨明顯，同時也弱化了溫和派人士的力量，將巴勒斯坦的團結短暫的推向極端份子，尤其是在國外的激端份子。而，以色列一向擅於利用巴勒斯坦的分歧，不僅利用此機會弱化Hamas政府並且將之描繪成無力帶來和平。
新的Hamas政府由於受到國際經濟制裁無力付薪水給政府公務員，而因此也無力掌握被國外激進份子所控制的軍事反抗勢力，因此，和以色列以外交手段達成協議更為困難。這正是巴勒斯坦政府所面臨的兩難局面。
Divisions within Hamas destabilize Palestinian Authority
By Steven Erlanger The New York Times
Published: July 3, 2006
The Palestinians have a bitter joke: What would happen if the Palestinian Authority disappeared? The answer: How could you tell?
The dysfunction and corruption of the authority - which was meant to be an interim arrangement, and without the powers of a real state - was a prime reason why Palestinian voters threw out the governing Fatah party in legislative elections in January. They took their chances with the militants of Hamas for many reasons, but one was the Islamic movement’s reputation for discipline, unity and honesty.
Hamas seemed to act with clear goals and speak with one voice, its spokesmen faithfully sticking to the party line.
Power, however, has proved a trap for Hamas, accentuating its divisions and causing new fractures. While Hamas has been fighting with Fatah in Gaza, trying to consolidate its control over the security forces there, it has been unable to control its own leaders in exile in Syria or its military wing, which operates with little regard for the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya.
The crisis touched off by the abduction of an Israeli soldier, and by the Israeli invasion of Gaza in response, has made Hamas’s divisions more apparent. At the same time, it has further weakened Palestinian moderates and pushed the Palestinians to a temporary unity that is closer to the extremist stance taken by those living abroad.
All of that may serve Israeli near- term goals - to weaken or destroy the Hamas government, and to portray it as incapable of making peace. But in the longer run it may make the territories even harder to control.
Israel has extensive experience in playing off Palestinian divisions and deepening them, whether it was trying to favor one or another of the groups in the original Palestine Liberation Organization, encouraging Hamas in the 1980s as a seemingly benign Islamic alternative to Yasser Arafat or trying to deal only with Palestinian mayors and clan leaders in the West Bank and Gaza before Arafat and his lieutenants returned from exile in 1994 after the Oslo peace accords.
Even then, Israel was deeply aware of tensions between the homegrown Palestinian leaders - most of whom had experience with the Israelis, even if it was in jail - and the returned revolutionaries, who quickly grabbed economic and military power.
Israel has also been skilled at trying to foment Fatah-Hamas rivalries, trying to create a form of chaos in the territories that might push President Mahmoud Abbas, of Fatah, to fire Haniya and his government.
The haplessness of Hamas has been evident in this latest crisis. The new leaders of the Palestinian Authority cannot pay salaries or provide social benefits because they cannot defeat the economic embargo that their election provoked. But the Hamas government has been unable to persuade Hamas militants, who take their orders from abroad, even to discuss a diplomatic resolution with Israel.
Instead, with Israeli troops already in Gaza and bombing its power plants and ministries in ”Operation Summer Rains,” Hamas is putting at risk its cherished hold on power and its power center in Gaza itself, its own little Hamastan.
But the Hamas leaders in exile - in particular Khaled Meshal, Mousa Abu Marzouk and Muhammad Nazzal - have little interest in domestic issues.
”The farther you are from the real problems on the ground, the more radical and inflexible you tend to be,” said Ali Jarbawi, a dean at Birzeit University here. ”That was true of Arafat in exile, and it’s true of Meshal in Damascus.”
Meshal, who with his Syrian hosts is said to fear losing influence to those in Gaza, has actively manipulated the current crisis, said Nasser al-Kidwa, a nephew of Arafat who was the Palestinian foreign minister in the former Fatah-led government. ”Meshal’s aim is to send a clear message about who is in control of Hamas - first to those in Hamas, and then to Palestinians generally,” Kidwa said.
But these Palestinian divisions also prevent Israel from reaching any equilibrium in the conflict, let alone solving it. The competition for power in the absence of a real state, in particular among armed groups, commanders and clans, means that those on the extremes tend to set the agenda.
Syria and Iran, which support the exiled Hamas leaders, have no interest in a calm Israeli-Palestinian relationship, and they are masters at manipulating the third rail of Palestinian politics - the need to pay respect and honor to those who fight Israel and ”the occupation,” including prisoners and suicide bombers.
While Hamas kept its own militants from shooting off Qassam rockets or conducting suicide attacks against Israel for about 16 months, it never tried to stop others from doing so and even provided rockets for them to fire. It could not turn its back on ”the resistance,” and finally was pushed by its own militants, who themselves were responding to popular anger over the deaths of Palestinian civilians in Israeli strikes, to give up the cease-fire altogether.
That gave Israel cause - Palestinians say a pretext - to move in force to try to strangle the baby of the Hamas government in its cradle.
While Palestinian divisions make negotiations difficult - Abbas cannot get anyone to follow his nonviolent lead - a spike in the conflict with Israel, like the one now in Gaza, forces Palestinians to unite, at least for a while, in defense against the enemy.
And that in turn makes it difficult for Palestinians to accept anything except their maximalist positions. So moderates like Abbas, or, relatively speaking, Haniya, have a short shelf life.
Israel has its own political third rail - the reputation of its military and the lives of its soldiers - that persists even in a society tired of fighting and occupation.
A dead soldier or civilian, like the 18- year-old Israeli settler who was kidnapped in the West Bank and executed by Palestinian militants last week, is a tragedy full of pain. But a live soldier held captive, like the 19-year-old corporal abducted in a raid into Israel, creates a crisis, pushing both sides in directions they do not necessarily want to go.
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